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GENERICS ARTICULATE DEFAULT GENERALIZATIONS
AbstrAct
Generic sentences express generalizations about kinds, such as “tigers are 
striped,” “ducks lay eggs,” and “ticks carry Lyme disease.” I present and review 
emerging evidence from adults and children that suggests that generics articulate 
cognitively default generalizations—i.e., they express basic, early-developing 
generalizations concerning kinds. In contrast, quantiied statements articulate 
cognitively more sophisticated and taxing generalizations. Further evidence 
suggests that generic generalizations don’t depend solely on information about 
prevalence. Instead, these fundamental generalizations are sensitive to a number 
of content-based factors, such as whether the property in question is dangerous 
or otherwise striking, or is an essential or characteristic property of the kind. 
This suggests that our most basic means of forming inductive generalizations is 
sensitive to rich, content-based factors.
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Introduction: Our Judgments of Generics
Generics are sentences that express generalizations about kinds, such 
as “tigers are striped,” “ducks lay eggs,” and “ticks carry Lyme disease.” 1 Quantiied sentences such as “all tigers are striped,” “most barns are red,” 
and “some ticks carry Lyme disease” can also express generalizations about 
kinds, but unlike generics, they convey information about how many members of the kind have the property in question. Quantiied statements have proved 
highly amenable to semantic analysis—for example, “all tigers are striped” is 
true just in case the set of tigers is included in the set of striped things. More generally, quantiied statements depend solely on straightforward content-
neutral information—of the sort that can be represented in set-theoretic 
terms—and as a result can be readily analyzed using the standard tools of 
formal semantics (e.g. Barwise & Cooper, 1981).In contrast to quantiied statements, generics have proved dificult for 
semanticists to analyze. As a simple illustration of why this is so, consider 
the generics “ducks lay eggs” and “ducks are female.” There are more female 
ducks than there are egg-laying ducks (since some female ducks are infertile, 
immature, and so on), yet the former statement seems intuitively true, while 
the latter does not. Similarly, consider “ticks carry Lyme disease”; this would 
seem to be clearly correct, yet only one percent of ticks carry the disease. 
Conversely, however, “books are paperbacks” does not seem to be correct, yet 
over eighty percent of books are paperbacks.
In Leslie (2007, 2008), I suggested that our judgments of generics 
may be sensitive to non-quantitative, content-based factors. In particular, I 
proposed that our judgments are sensitive to whether the property in question 
is characteristic of the kind—e.g., does the property specify how the kind 
reproduces? How it nurtures its young? It’s identifying salient physical 
features?—and also to whether the property in question is striking—e.g., 
dangerous, threatening, appalling; the sort of property about which one would 
wish to be forewarned. If a property is either characteristic or striking, then the 
generic may well be accepted at low prevalence levels—hence the disposition 
to accept “ducks lay eggs” and “ticks carry Lyme disease” respectively. I also 
proposed that our judgments may be sensitive to the nature of the exceptions to 
the generic claim. That is, amongst the members of the kind that fail to have the 
predicated property, it matters how they fail to have the property—in particular 
whether they simply lack the property, or whether they have an equally salient, 
concrete, positive property instead. The non-infected ticks simply do not carry 
1. This paper will focus on bare plural generics, however English also allows for indeinite singular (e.g., “a tiger is striped”) and deinite singular generics (e.g., “the tiger is 
striped”).
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Lyme disease—they do not have an alternative property instead. However, the 
books that are not paperbacks are instead hardcover. Consider also “people 
are right-handed,” “elementary school teachers are female”—in both cases 
the predicated property is highly prevalent, yet the generic is intuitively false. 
But again there are “positive counterinstances”—people who are not right-
handed are instead left-handed; elementary school teachers who are not female 
are male. Intuitively, it feels as though we would be “overlooking” these 
hardcover books, these left-handed individuals, and these male school teachers 
if we accepted the generics in question. Thus, I proposed that generics are 
likely to be rejected even if the property is highly prevalent, if there are these 
“positive counterinstances.” (For a more detailed presentation of these aspects 
of the proposal, see Leslie, 2007, 2008, in press a; for a discussion of social 
prejudice in light of this account, see Leslie, in press b.)
In this earlier work, I relied on my own evaluations of the generics in 
question, and on evaluations that have been made in the literature by linguists 
and philosophers for a number of years now (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & 
Pelletier, 1995; Lawler, 1973). That is, I took for granted that “ticks carry 
Lyme disease” can be true even if few ticks carry the disease; this was one key 
point I sought to explain. Recently, several experiments have been conducted 
to test whether naïve participants also share the theorists’ intuitions that, e.g., 
a generic such as “ticks carry Lyme disease” can be true even though very few 
ticks carry the disease. Yet one might wonder what the value of conducting 
such empirical tests could possibly be: haven’t the theorists already established 
the conclusion that the empirical work will surely support? That is, don’t we 
already know that “ticks carry Lyme disease” can be true despite the low 
percentage of infected ticks?
Empirical work in this regard is valuable, even if it is unlikely to 
overturn orthodoxy. For one, even if it is unlikely to overturn orthodoxy, 
one can never be certain. Suppose, for example, that false beliefs about the 
percentage of ticks that carry Lyme disease abound in the population: most 
people believe that approximately 80% of ticks are infected. Suppose further 
that people only reliably accept generics when they believe the prevalence of 
the property to be high. In this scenario, the generic sentence “ticks carry Lyme 
disease” is reliably asserted, but only because of false beliefs about prevalence. 
A theorist may grow up hearing “ticks carry Lyme disease”—may read the 
sentence repeatedly in the media—and so hear the sentence as true. Later, 
while conducting work on generics, the theorist may learn that in fact very few 
ticks carry Lyme disease, but since her belief in the truth of “ticks carry Lyme 
disease” has been built up over many years, she may still remain conident that 
the sentence is true, and so write that “ticks carry Lyme disease” can be true despite few ticks carrying the disease. However, all this scenario would relect 
is that our beliefs in the truth of generics are not easily overturned, despite 
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being in the general case driven solely by underlying beliefs about prevalence. 
If it is only the theorists who accept generics at low prevalence levels, this 
should give us pause for thought—and whether such a situation obtains cannot 
be determined on the basis of theorist intuition.
In this case, however, results from recent empirical studies comport 
with the observations made by linguists and philosophers. For example, 
Amanda Brandone, Andrei Cimpian, Susan Gelman and I found that adults are signiicantly more likely to accept sentences such as “birds lay eggs” (or 
“lions have manes,” or “pigs give milk their young”) than they are to accept 
sentences such as “birds are female” (or “lions are male,” or “pigs are female”), 
despite appreciating that there are comparable numbers of female birds (or 
male lions, or female pigs) and egg-laying birds (or maned lions, or nursing 
pigs) (Brandone, Cimpian, Leslie & Gelman, 2012). That is, for a range of 
examples, participants understand that only one sex of the kind has a particular 
characteristic property, yet they are far more likely to accept a generic that 
predicates the characteristic property than they are to accept a generic that 
predicates belonging to that sex.
Sandeep Prasada, Sangeet Khemlani, Sam Glucksberg and I further 
examined participants’ judgments of a range of generics, including generics 
that predicate non-prevalent but strikingly dangerous properties (e.g. 
“ticks carry Lyme disease,” “sharks attack swimmers,” “mosquitoes carry 
malaria”), and generics that predicate prevalent properties, but have “positive 
counterinstances” (e.g., “books are paperbacks,” “Canadians are right-
handed,” and “teachers are female”). We also elicited prevalence estimates 
from participants—that is, participants were asked to judge what percentage 
of the kind has the property in question. As predicted, participants gave much 
higher prevalence estimates for the positive counterinstance items than for the 
strikingly dangerous items, yet were much more likely to endorse the strikingly 
dangerous generics than the positive counterinstance generics (Prasada, 
Khemlani, Leslie & Glucksberg, submitted).
It is sometimes suggested that generics such as “ticks carry Lyme 
disease” are accepted because, even though few ticks carry it, ticks are the 
only creatures that do so. That is, even though few ticks carry Lyme disease, 
Lyme disease carriers are overwhelmingly ticks. Thus, perhaps we do not need 
to appeal to content-based factors such as whether the property is dangerous 
or not; perhaps it is simply that if something carries Lyme disease, then it is 
almost certainly a tick. Such a measure would be the “inverse” of prevalence: 
prevalence can be modeled as the conditional probability of carrying Lyme 
disease given that one is a tick, while this measure would be the conditional 
probability of being a tick given that one carries Lyme disease. In the 
psychology literature, this measure is known as cue validity.
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While there are some examples, actual and hypothetical, that tell against 
this possibility (see, e.g., Leslie, 2008), it is dificult to rule out deinitively 
while relying solely on our intuitions as pure theorists of generics. However, it 
is easy to evaluate this hypothesis in the laboratory. To this end, Prasada et al. 
also elicited cue validity ratings in our study, and so we were able to control for 
cue validity across our different categories of generics. That is, the items in the 
strikingly dangerous category had the same average cue validity ratings as the 
items in the positive counterinstance category, yet the above results obtained 
nonetheless. If the strikingly dangerous generics were accepted because they 
had high cue validity ratings, this would not have been possible; the positive 
counterinstance generics had the same cue validity ratings, yet they were not 
accepted—despite being associated with much higher prevalence estimates. 
Cue validity cannot explain why these striking generics were accepted at low 
prevalence levels.
The category of strikingly dangerous generics in the Prasada et al. 
study was constructed so as to contain generics that predicate dangerous yet 
non-prevalent properties. That it was possible to do so—that is, to construct 
a range of generics that predicate strikingly dangerous properties and are 
accepted despite having low associated prevalence estimates and mid-range 
cue validity estimates—lends indirect support to the hypothesis in Leslie 
(2007, 2008). However, the support is only indirect, since it does not involve 
directly testing the impact of a property’s being dangerous on people’s 
judgments. Recent work conducted by Andrei Cimpian, Amanda Brandone, 
and Susan Gelman, however, examined precisely this question (Cimpian, 
Brandone & Gelman, 2010). In their experiment, participants were told about a 
novel animal kind, e.g. “lorches.” They were then told that a certain percentage 
of lorches had a particular property, e.g., purple feathers, then they were 
given some further information about the feathers. Crucially, in some cases, 
this further information described a dangerous property—e.g., the feathers 
were poisonous to the touch—whereas in other cases it was anodyne. The 
participants were then asked to evaluate a generic attributing the property to 
the kind. The experimenters found that, at low prevalence levels, participants were signiicantly more likely to accept the generic if the property in question 
was dangerous, thus lending support to the hypothesis that our judgments of 
generics are sensitive to factors such as whether the property being predicated 
is strikingly dangerous (Leslie, 2007, 2008).
One point to note is that in the Cimpian et al. study, the non-dangerous 
properties were still inherent, biologically-based properties (e.g., purple 
feathers), and so may have been understood to be characteristic properties of 
the kind. 2 That is, the rate of acceptance of these non-dangerous but inherent 
2. Cimpian et al. also found that participants were more likely to accept the generic at 
low prevalence levels if they were told that the property in question was distinctive—i.e. that 
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properties may already have been high relative to more “accidental” properties. 
To examine this, Cimpian et al. adapted their paradigm to include properties 
that would likely be interpreted as accidental, non-characteristic properties—
e.g. muddy feathers, broken legs. In the case of such properties, participants 
almost never accepted the generic at low prevalence levels; instead they only 
accepted the generic when a strong majority of the kind possessed the property, 
which is consistent again with the predictions made in Leslie (2007, 2008). 
Susan Gelman and Paul Bloom (2007) also found converging evidence of 
the impact of the inherent and biological vs the adopted and accidental on 
adults’judgments of generics.
Recent empirical work thus suggests that adults’ judgments of generics 
are sensitive to rich, content-based factors such as whether the property in 
question is strikingly dangerous, whether it is an inherent characteristic property 
of the kind, or whether it is merely accidentally possessed by members of the 
kind. The impact of these factors does not appear to be reducible to abstract, 
quantitative measures such as prevalence and cue validity.
The Psychological Signiicance of Generics
The question one faces at this juncture is whether the foregoing observations and indings simply amount to the following: there is a class of 
sentences, evaluations of which are sensitive to a number of surprising factors. 
This would be of some interest to some theorists, but may not be terribly 
gripping at the end of the day. Is this as far as the study of generics can take us, 
or might it hold interest from the perspective of the nature of cognition more 
generally?
no other animals on the island had the property. One possibility is that this inding relects 
an effect of cue validity on people’s judgments. (Note that the possibility that cue validity 
affects judgments is different from the hypothesis that cue validity is the explanation—to the 
exclusion of the impact of danger—of judgments of low-prevalence generics such as “ticks 
carry Lyme disease”—the latter is inconsistent with the evidence that is currently available, 
while the former remains an empirical possibility.) That is, all else being equal, people may 
be more likely to accept a generic if cue validity is high. Another possibility is that this 
effect is limited to salient physical characteristics of the kind—the sorts of features that 
are extremely helpful to us in perceptually identifying whether something is a member of a 
given kind or not, even if the features are only had by some members—and that the effect of 
distinctiveness operates by way of making it more likely that the property in question is seen 
as characteristic of the kind. That is, rather than there being a general effect of cue validity 
on people’s judgments across the board, there may be a more limited effect of distinctiveness 
on identifying physical characteristics. This is an open empirical question at this point in time. (Again, this is a question that would be exceedingly dificult to decide by considering 
theorist’s intuitions about a small number of examples, but that can be readily resolved in 
the laboratory.)
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Taking a step back for a moment, let us note that one of the most important 
tasks a learner faces is how to arrive at general information that applies to 
situations and instances that they have not yet encountered—how to move 
from the particular to the general. If one is unable to generalize information in 
this sense, one’s knowledge will be forever bound to the here-and-now—every 
new situation must be encountered without the support of prior knowledge. As 
it happens, if one touches a hot stove and burns one’s hand, one will be careful 
about touching that stove in the future, and one will also be careful about 
touching other stoves. This sort of learning involves generalization in the sense I am using it here—in the irst instance, generalization from one time to future 
times; and in the second, from one instance of a kind to other instances of a 
kind, namely other stoves. There is a sense in which the capacity to generalize 
is the backbone of all learning—without it, one could only catalog discrete and 
seemingly unrelated events.It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that infants in the irst year of life are 
able to form general judgments (e.g. Baldwin, Markman & Melartin, 1993; 
Graham, Kilbreath & Welder, 2001). They are, for example, able to form 
expectations concerning the properties of novel instances of a kind or category 
on the basis of experience with other instances. Thus they expect that, if one 
item makes a rattling noise when it is shaken, perceptually similar items will 
do so too. Infants are not simply trapped in the here-and-now—they can extract 
general information from a situation and apply it to a novel one.
There must therefore be something about the infants’ cognitive 
capacities that allows them to do this, something in their cognitive makeup that 
permits them to form and exploit general judgments—a cognitive mechanism 
that forms general judgments. We might then call the generalizations that are 
formed by this mechanism cognitively fundamental generalizations. This 
mechanism would represent our most natural and default way of forming 
general judgments, and would produce the sorts of general judgments that we 
make from our earliest days.
An interesting question, then, is whether language later provides us 
with a way of giving voice to these generalizations that we have been making 
all along. It is not guaranteed that natural language must provide us with 
such a vehicle, but it is reasonable to suppose it might (and would be quite 
surprising if it did not). We can thus ask the question: of the many ways we 
have of linguistically expressing generalizations, which form articulates our 
cognitively fundamental generalizations? That is, if an adult forms a general 
judgment using this fundamental, default mechanism of generalization and 
wishes to communicate this belief using natural language, what linguistic form 
will be used? The answer I propose here and elsewhere is: the generic form.
One observation that can be made in support of this hypothesis is that, 
while there is a word in English “all” that signals a universal generalization, 
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a word “some” that signals an existential one, and so on for all the quantiier 
words—both determiners and adverbs—there is no word “gen” in English that 
signals a generic generalization. That is, we do not say “gen tigers are striped” 
in the way we say “all tigers are striped” or “most tigers are striped.” 3 This is 
not an isolated fact about English either: there is no known language that has 
a dedicated, articulated generic operator—no word “gen” that uniquely signals 
that a generalization is a generic one. While languages differ dramatically in how generic claims are syntactically manifested, one does not ind phonological 
forms that are dedicated to the expression of generic claims—generics are 
always unmarked in this way (Dahl, 1985). This would seem a puzzling fact: 
why should this be the case? And even if a language with a “gen” in it were to 
be found, we would still be left with the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of languages do not contain such a linguistic item—a linguistic quasi-universal 
that would still cry out for explanation.
Such an explanation is forthcoming if generics are language’s way of 
letting us give voice to cognitively fundamental generalizations (Leslie, 2007, 2008). If one wishes to interact eficiently with a system, and the system has a 
basic, default way of proceeding or performing a task, then one need only issue 
an explicit instruction to the system if one wishes it to deviate from this default 
way of proceeding. As an intuitive illustration, suppose that one is dealing with 
a recalcitrant teenager who by default never tidies his room. If on a particular 
occasion one does not wish for said teenager to tidy his room, one need not 
say anything—it would be a waste of breath, as it were, to say “please do 
not tidy your room today,” since if one says nothing, this is precisely what 
will happen. One need only speak up if one wishes the teenager to deviate from his default; then one must ask that the room be cleaned. Quantiiers, I propose, are articulated precisely because quantiied generalizations are 
non-default generalizations. For the cognitive system to form a universal 
generalization it must be told to form a universal generalization, as it were—
and this requires that there be a word in natural language like “all.” Such non-
default generalizations must be explicitly marked—they are like the instruction 
to the teenager to clean his room. However, generic sentences contain no such marking—there is no item in them that speciies what sort of generalization is 
here being expressed. As a result, the cognitive system supplies its own default 
means of generalizing. To explicitly instruct a system to operate according to its default is ineficient and unnecessary—akin to instructing the teenager 
3. It is sometimes proposed in conversation that we do have such a word, namely 
the adverb “generally.” However, inserting “generally” into a generic produces a change in 
meaning. For example, “books are generally paperbacks,” “Canadians are generally right-
handed,” and “elementary school teachers are generally female” would all appear to be 
perfectly acceptable statements, while their generic counterparts are reliably rejected.
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not to tidy his room—hence the universal or near universal absence of a word 
“gen.”
The hypothesis that generics articulate cognitively default 
generalizations, then, allows us to explain this otherwise puzzling cross-
linguistic fact. Further, it issues in a number of empirical predictions. For example, if processing quantiied statements requires the cognitive system 
to deviate from its generic default, we would expect that sometimes this default would be inadequately suppressed, and quantiied statements would 
be processed as though they were generics. This might show up in a number 
of ways—in evaluation tasks, in memory tasks, in reasoning tasks. We might 
further predict that this tendency would be found in adults, but that it would 
be most pronounced in young children—since in general, children are less 
likely than adults to be able to successfully inhibit default processes. We would 
also correspondingly predict that generics would prove quite easy for young children to acquire—easier to acquire than quantiiers.
In case these predictions seem in any way obvious, consider the following contrasting point of view. Quantiied statements depend solely on 
clean, quantitative information, of the sort that is theoretically highly tractable. 
Generics, on the other hand, appear to be sensitive to all sorts of messy, 
complicated, content-based factors, as the discussion in the previous section 
indicates. Surely it would be easier to acquire and process the former than the 
latter! Further, the fact that there is no word “gen” should make the learner’s 
task even harder—she is not even presented with an articulated word whose meaning she can try to igure out. So we have something elegant, tractable, and 
articulated like “all” on the one hand, and the opaque, elusive and mysterious 
generic on the other. It would be quite natural to suppose that a child would ind the former easier to acquire than the latter, and that the latter would impose 
greater processing demands so that if anything children and adults alike should 
default from the generic to the quantiied, rather than vice-versa.
Generics in Acquisition
Toddlers begin to produce generics at approximately 30 months of age, which is the irst time that they reliably have the requisite background 
syntactic capabilities (e.g., suficiently many words per utterance, plurality, 
etc; Gelman, 2010; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka & Flukes, 2008). By the time 
children are between 3 to 4 years of age, they produce generics as frequently 
as adults do—which is not something that is true for all parts of language 
by a long shot (Gelman et al., 2008). Thirty-month-old toddlers are further able to draw different inferences from generics than from speciic statements. 
That is, if they are shown some members of a novel animal kind performing 
an action such as drinking milk and told either “blicks drink milk” or “these 
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blicks drink milk,” they are more likely to generalize the action of drinking 
milk to novel blicks if they hear generic language (Graham, Nayer & Gelman, 
2010). Thus, 30-month-olds understand that generics express generalizations, in contrast to speciic statements, and further are able to deploy this fact in 
drawing inferences.
Two-year-olds also understand that generics tolerate exceptions. For 
example, Susan Gelman and Lakshmi Raman (2003) showed young children 
pictures of familiar animals that were exceptions to a generic generalization—
the children might have been shown, e.g., a picture of penguins. The children 
were then either asked “do these birds ly?” or “do birds ly?” If young children 
understand that generics tolerate exceptions, then they should answer “no” to the speciic question but “yes” to the generic one, and the experimenters found 
that toddlers as young as 30 months were able to do just this. Several other 
studies have also found that preschoolers understand that generics tolerate 
exceptions in this way (e.g., Chambers, Graham & Turner, 2008; Gelman & 
Bloom, 2007; Gelman, Star & Flukes, 2002).
What of preschoolers’ comprehension of “troublesome” generics—the sorts of generics that have caused dificulty for semanticists studying these 
sentences? Amanda Brandone, Andrei Cimpian, Susan Gelman and I have 
begun to research this issue. The question we posed was: if a preschooler 
knows that, e.g., only girl birds lay eggs, how will she evaluate “birds lay eggs” 
and “birds are girls”? If a child has the relevant background knowledge, then 
she will at least implicitly believe that there are as many girl birds as there are 
egg-laying birds. Thus, if preschoolers’ judgments, unlike adults’, are driven 
by considerations of prevalence, then such a child should be equally likely to 
endorse the two generics. If, however, preschool children are sensitive to the 
same factors as adults, then they should be more likely to accept “birds lay 
eggs” than “birds are girls.” We used a range of items that included methods 
of reproduction, salient identifying physical features, and means of nurturing 
the young, and we only considered data from trials in which the preschooler 
in question knew that only one gender of the animal kind in question had 
the property. We found that preschoolers, like adults, were far more likely to 
endorse generics that attribute a characteristic property to the kind than they 
were to endorse generics that predicated belonging to a given gender. 4 This 
4. “Male” and “female” are not words that preschoolers are generally familiar with, 
hence the use of “boys” and “girls.” However, we wanted to be sure that the children did not 
think we were asking whether birds were human girls, so we conducted a follow-up study 
where we asked them to evaluate generics such as “mommy bears are girls.” Our participants 
readily endorsed such items. We were also concerned that there was a miss-match between 
the types of main verbs in the two sentences—the gender attribution items were all of the 
form “are boys/girls,” where as the characteristic items either contained action verbs or the 
verb “to have” (e.g. “lions have manes”). In a follow-up study, we converted all of the 
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suggests that even for preschoolers, generics are not simple expressions of 
beliefs about prevalence (Brandone et al., 2012).
While a more complete investigation into preschoolers’ understanding 
of generics is needed (and indeed is underway), the available evidence suggests 
that, like adults, they understand that generics a) tolerate exceptions, and b) 
do not depend solely on considerations of prevalence. The data so far also 
indicate that generics are acquired easily and early. We might ask, then, how the acquisition of generics compares to the acquisition of quantiiers. Consider, for example, the quantiier “most,” which one might suppose to be the closest 
cousin of generics, since it too could be said to “tolerate exceptions.” Is “most” 
acquired in a comparable time frame?
The answer to this question appears to be a resounding “no.” Preschoolers appear to ind “most” very dificult to process, even on simple 
tasks. For example, suppose there are six crayons, some of which are in a box, 
others of which are not. The child is then asked “are most of the crayons in the box?” Papafragou and Schwarz (2005/2006) found that preschool children found the task exceedingly dificult; there was not even a consistent pattern 
to their responses. Further, even 6- to 8-year-olds—who are quite old in 
terms of language acquisition—differed from adults on the task. Papafragou and Schwarz’s inding has subsequently been replicated (e.g., Barner, Chow 
& Yang, 2009; Leslie & Gelman, 2012, experiment 2). (Some researchers 
have suggested that preschoolers have some understanding of “most,” which 
manifests itself if the task is made even easier (Haldberda, Taing & Lidz, 
2008)—however, even if preschoolers have some competence with “most,” it is clear that it is minimally very dificult for them to process.)In the case of the quantiiers “all” and “some,” however, even young 
preschoolers are able to pass a comparable task—that is, they can say whether, 
e.g., some/all of a small set of crayons before them are in a box or not (e.g., 
Barner et al., 2009). There is a sense, though, in which such scenarios do not 
require children to process full-blooded generalizations. They are not asked to 
make generalizations about crayons in general—as a kind or class—but only 
to form some beliefs about a set of crayons directly before them. The judgment 
that all of these crayons are in the box does not involve any expectation as to 
whether a newly introduced crayon will be in the box or not. It simply does 
not apply to any crayon that is not one of these crayons. The judgment here is 
not an open-ended, kind-wide, projectable generalization. (Note that generic 
generalizations can only be of this open-ended sort—there is no way of even 
formulating a generic that pertains only to these 6 crayons.) Developmental studies of the acquisition and processing of quantiiers, however, have mostly 
predicates to the form “are animals that…”—e.g. “lions are animals that have manes” vs 
“lions are animals that are boys.” The same results were obtained as in the original study.
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considered only these sorts of scenarios: ones in which children are presented with a small set of items and then asked to evaluate quantiied statements 
pertaining to those particular items. Let us then pose the question: How do 
preschoolers fare when asked to consider open-ended, kind-wide, projectable quantiied generalizations?
Defaulting to the Generic
In a relatively early study, Michelle Hollander, Susan Gelman, and Jon Star (2002) tested preschoolers’ comprehension of kind-wide quantiied 
statements. In their study, 3- and 4-year-olds and adults were asked a number of yes/no questions. The questions were either existentially quantiied (e.g., 
“are some ires hot?”), universally quantiied (e.g., “are all ires hot?”), or 
generic (e.g., “are ires hot?”). Importantly, for all three question types, their 
participants were asked to evaluate open-ended, kind-wide generalizations—as opposed to being asked questions about a speciic and limited set of items 
before them. The questions covered a range of properties—some were had by 
all or almost all members of the kind, others by some but not all members of 
the kind, and others by no members of the kind.
In the case of responses to the generic questions, the experimenters 
found no developmental differences in the responses; that is, 3-year-olds, 
4-year-olds and adults gave statistically indistinguishable responses to the questions when they occurred in generic form. In the case of the quantiied 
questions, however, they found clear developmental changes, with all three 
age groups giving different patterns of responses. What was most intriguing 
about the data, though, were the response patterns provided by the 3-year-
olds: this youngest group of participants responded in the same way regardless 
of whether the question was universal, existential, or generic. This pattern of 
responses was the same as the pattern of responses provided by the 4-year-olds 
and the adults to the generic questions. Thus an intriguing possibility emerged: might the 3-year-olds be interpreting the quantiied statements as though 
they were generics? Such a possibility is precisely what one would expect to ind if generics articulate cognitively default generalizations. Processing and evaluating kind-wide quantiied statements would require inhibiting the 
generic default and engaging in a more taxing cognitive process—people, 
especially young children, may not always do so successfully, and so would be susceptible to treating quantiied statements as though they were generics.It should be noted that, even if the 3-year-olds found the quantiied statements dificult to process, there are many, many possible alternative 
response patterns that they might have produced. They could, for example, 
simply have said “yes” to every quantiied question, or “no,” or given responses 
with no clear pattern to them. (Such responses are frequently encountered 
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in developmental work—if children do not understand a task or a question, 
they often respond at random.) But this is not what happened here; instead they gave the same responses to the quantiied questions as they gave to the 
generic questions—which in turn were indistinguishable from the responses 
adults gave to those generic questions. Further, the 4-year-old children also differed from adults in their responses to the quantiied—but not the generic—
questions. In particular, their response patterns were intermediate between the 
3-year-olds’ generic pattern, and the adults’ pattern. Thus, it is possible that, in some trials, the 4-year-olds were also interpreting quantiied statements as 
generics.
After they had asked the children these kind-wide questions, the 
experimenters asked the children universal and existential questions that pertained to speciic sets of items before them (e.g., “are all of these crayons in the box?”). Here, even the youngest children were able to answer correctly—
thus, they did not lack a basic competence with “all” and “some,” but rather 
appeared to be unable to properly process them when confronted with an open-
ended, kind-wide generalization.
Hollander et al.’s indings were recently replicated and extended to 
Mandarin-speaking preschoolers (Tardif, Gelman, Fu & Zhu, 2011). The 
results from the Mandarin-speaking population were even more dramatic: even 
Mandarin-speaking 4-year-olds gave indistinguishable responses to universals, 
existentials, and generics. Again, the researchers found no developmental 
differences in answers to the generic questions—the Mandarin-speaking 
preschoolers responded just like adults to the generic questions, but also gave this generic response pattern to the quantiied questions.
The results from Hollander et al. (2002) and Tardif et al. (2011) suggest 
that, even if young children are able to understand “all” and “some” when 
used in the context of a small set of items (e.g., “all of these crayons”), they nonetheless have dificulty processing kind-wide quantiied statements, and 
may fall back on their interpretation of the relevant generic instead. However, 
in the Hollander et al. and Tardif et al. studies, children had to rely on their 
background knowledge of the kind to evaluate the kind-wide statements, 
whereas they had the all the relevant instances before them (e.g., the 6 crayons) when asked to evaluate quantiied statements concerning a small set of items. 
To what extent is this asymmetry important? Certainly, relying on memory 
increases the cognitive demands associated with performing a task, and so perhaps the children only defaulted to the generic because of the dificulty of 
the task. However, it would constitute an even more dramatic illustration of the power of the generic default if they treated quantiied statements as generics 
even when they do not have to rely on memory to complete the task.
Susan Gelman and I (Leslie & Gelman, 2012, experiment 4) presented 
4-year-olds and adults with pictures of a novel animal kind, introduced with 
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a novel label e.g., “these are gorps.” In each case, there were 8 individual 
members of the novel kind, and we ensured that the child understood that each 
of the 8 was indeed a member of the kind. The 8 depicted instances were identical, except for a speciic target feature—e.g. curly hair—that was had by 
only 6 of the 8. Each child was then asked a question about the novel animals: 
the question was either a generic (“do gorps have curly hair?”), a “speciic” 
universal (“do all of these gorps have curly hair?”), or a kind-wide universal 
(“do all gorps have curly hair?”). The 4-year-olds, like the adults, tended to 
agree to the generic question, saying “yes” to it on 83% of trials. They also performed well with the speciic universal, correctly denying that all of these 
gorps have curly hair on 79% of trials. However, when asked the kind-wide 
universal question, the 4-year-olds responded “yes” on 51% of trials, which was signiicantly higher than the rate at which they accepted the speciic 
universal (21% of trials). The children had the pictures of the gorps in front 
of them during questioning, and so had the falsifying counterexamples—the 
hairless gorps—before them when evaluating the kind-wide universal. They 
clearly understood that not all of these gorps have curly hair, yet they were not 
consistently able to correctly reject the kind-wide universal, even under these 
circumstances. Again, these otherwise puzzling data are readily explained by 
the hypothesis that preschoolers sometimes substitute their evaluation of a 
generic for their evaluation of a kind-wide universal. The preschoolers replied 
that all gorps have curly hair because they did not consistently evaluate the 
universal as a universal, but rather on some trials assimilated it to the generic 
gorps have curly hair. We are currently investigating this tendency at other prevalence levels, with different age groups, and with other quantiiers (in 
particular, “some”).Thus, several experiments have turned up indings that are precisely 
what one would expect if generics do indeed express cognitively default generalizations, in contrast to quantiiers. The data would be otherwise quite 
puzzling and surprising—e.g., why are 4-year-olds able to use hairless gorps to 
consistently reject “all of these gorps have curly hair” but not to consistently 
reject “all gorps have curly hair”? However, the data reviewed thus far all 
concern preschool children. On the generics-as-defaults hypothesis, one would 
expect this tendency to be most pronounced in young children, but one would also expect to ind evidence of it in adults. Thus, we might pose the question: do adults ever interpret quantiied statements as generics?
Sangeet Khemlani, Sam Gluckberg and I investigated precisely this 
question (Leslie, Khemlani & Glucksberg, 2011). In particular, we were 
interested to learn whether adults would ever accept universals such as “all 
ducks lay eggs,” despite knowing that, e.g., male ducks do not lay eggs. We 
found that adults have a robust tendency to do precisely this. For example, if asked to irst evaluate universals such as “all ducks lay eggs” and then 
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later to evaluate statements such as “male ducks lay eggs,” participants who 
correctly rejected the latter were just as likely to have accepted the universal 
as they were to have rejected it. One might wonder what would happen if the 
ordering was reversed—if participants irst rejected “male ducks lay eggs” (as 
the vast majority of them do), and were then subsequently asked to evaluate 
the universal “all ducks lay eggs.” Reversing the order of the blocks in this 
way reduced the tendency to accept the universal, but it did not eliminate it: on 
almost 20% of trials, adults still went on to accept “all ducks lay eggs” despite 
having just rejected “male ducks lay eggs” (Leslie et al., 2011, experiment 3). (This percentage of trials was signiicantly greater than zero, and signiicantly 
greater than the percentage of trials on which participants gave other incorrect response patterns.) Again, these data are dificult to explain, unless one 
supposes that the adult participants were not really evaluating the universals at 
all—but were instead evaluating the corresponding generic “ducks lay eggs.” 5 
5. One possible alternative explanation of these data could be that participants were interpreting the universal quantiier as ranging over subkinds of ducks, rather than individual 
ducks. That is, perhaps participants understood “all ducks lay eggs” to mean that mallard 
ducks lay eggs, and mandarin ducks lay eggs, and so on for each subkind of duck. There are 
several reasons to believe this was not the case. As a direct measure, we asked participants 
to paraphrase the statements they had been asked to evaluate; if a subkind interpretation 
could account for the high (close to 50%) rate of acceptance of the universals, one would 
expect that a reasonable percentage of the paraphrases would contain some indication of this. 
Crucially, participants who accepted a given universal should be more likely to use subkinds 
in their paraphrases than participants who rejected that universal. Instead, vanishingly few 
paraphrases had any reference to subkinds whatsoever, and there was no difference to be 
found along this dimension between participants who accepted vs rejected a given universal 
(Leslie et al., 2011, experiment 2B). (The same applied to another possible explanation: 
namely that participants were understanding the universal to be domain restricted, e.g. to only 
be about female ducks. The paraphrase task found no evidence of this whatsoever.) Secondly, 
we ran a version of the study where participants were presented with population information 
designed to make a subkind interpretation very unnatural. For example, participants were 
told: “There are 4.16 million ducks in the world. Evaluate the following statement: All ducks 
lay eggs.” The use of population information should make a subkind interpretation (or any 
kind of domain restricted interpretation) very odd, and yet we still found a robust tendency to 
accept the universal statements (Leslie et al., 2011, experiment 2A). Thirdly, Susan Gelman 
and I tested whether adults would be more likely to accept universal statements about novel 
kinds if a) not all individuals have the target property, but b) the kinds were presented to them 
as having salient subkinds which were such that each subkind could be said to generically 
have the property. That is, we manipulated the availability of a subkind interpretation of a universal, but did not ind any increase in the (extremely low) rate at which adults accepted 
the universal as a result (Leslie & Gelman, 2012, experiment 4). Thus, there does not appear 
to be any evidence that participants are disposed to employ a subkind interpretation of these universals, and so this is very unlikely to be the explanation of the indings. Instead, we 
propose that, like young children, adults have some tendency to default to the generic when evaluating quantiied statements.
40 sarah-jane leslie
Meredith Meyer, Susan Gelman, and Sarah Stilwell tested adults’ evaluations of universally quantiied statements and also found evidence that they were 
interpreting them as though they were generics. Importantly, they also found 
that the tendency to do so becomes stronger when adults are under time 
pressure (Meyer, Gelman & Stilwell, 2010).
Converging evidence is also to be found in studies on adult reasoning. Several studies have found that adults make speciic reasoning errors when 
dealing with kind-wide universal statements—errors that would be readily 
explained if they were treating those universals as generics. For example, 
Steven Sloman (1993, 1998) investigated adults’ evaluations of arguments that involve the quantiier “all,” and found that their evaluations did not conform to the logic of universal quantiication. His participants judged that, e.g., argument 
A is stronger than argument B, despite judging that reptiles are indeed animals:
 (A) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter; therefore all mammals 
use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter
 (B) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter; therefore all reptiles 
use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter
Such an assessment would be readily understandable if Sloman’s participants 
were in fact interpreting these universals as generics, since reptiles may be 
naturally thought to be more likely than mammals to be exceptions to the 
generic “animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter.”
Similarly, Martin Jönsson and James Hampton found that adults 
consistently judged universals such as “all ravens are black” to be more likely 
to be true than universals such as “all young jungle ravens are black”—despite 
the fact that young jungle ravens are a subset of ravens, and so if the latter 
universal is false then so is the former (Jönsson & Hampton, 2006). If one 
replaces the universals with generics, however, then this judgment is very 
reasonable: since generics tolerate exceptions, it is possible for “ravens are 
black” to be true even if young jungle ravens are not. Since the latter are an unknown quantity, one could reasonably be more conident in the more 
inclusive statement. Thus, again, if Jönsson and Hampton’s participants were interpreting the universals as generics, the indings would be readily explicable.
Further evidence for the generics-as-default hypothesis also emerged 
from a recent memory study. Since much of the foregoing evidence derives 
from evaluation tasks, Susan Gelman and I wished to use a measure that would 
tap into a distinct set of behavioral responses. To do so, we tested preschoolers’ and adults’ recall of quantiied statements and generics (Leslie & Gelman, 
2012). We predicted that 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds and adults would all tend to recall quantiied statements as generics. We indeed found a marked tendency in all three age groups to recall statements quantiied with “all” and “most” 
as generics. Adults and 4-year-olds generally recalled “some” statements 
generics articulate default generalizations 41
correctly, however 3-year-olds tended to recall even these existentials as 
generics. We then examined 3-year-olds’ recall of “no” statements—for 
example “no butterlies taste with their mouths.” One possibility was that 3-year-olds may have simply been “dropping the irst word”—namely the quantiier—and so employing a “dumb” strategy which would not lend any 
particular support to the generics-as-defaults hypothesis. If this was the case, 
then the 3-year-olds should recall “no butterlies taste with their mouths” as 
“butteries taste with their mouths”—i.e. “no” statements would be recalled as 
positive generics. However, 3-year-olds almost never recalled “no” statements 
as positive generics—instead, “no” statements were frequently recalled as 
negated generics, e.g. “butterlies don’t taste with their mouths.” Thus the youngest children recalled quantiied statements as generics even when doing 
so required introducing a negation into the sentence, thereby adding to the 
growing body of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that generics express 
cognitively default generalizations.
Conclusion
The available empirical evidence would seem to support the hypothesis 
that generics articulate cognitively fundamental, default generalizations, while quantiiers articulate more taxing and sophisticated ones. The hypothesis pulls 
together and explains a range of otherwise puzzling results from a variety 
of experimental paradigms across diverse age groups. If we combine this 
idea with the observations concerning the non-quantitative nature of generic 
generalizations, we are led to the following conclusion: our most basic way of 
forming general judgments is not fundamentally driven by considerations of 
prevalence or cue validity as many psychologists have supposed (e.g. Rosch, 
1978), but rather is sensitive to rich, content-based factors, such as whether the 
property being generalized is dangerous, or characteristic of the kind in question.
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résumé
Les phrases génériques expriment des généralisations sur les espèces, 
comme « les tigres ont des rayures », « les canards pondent des œufs », « les 
tiques transmettent la borréliose ». Je présente et examine de nouvelles 
données d’adultes et d’enfants qui suggèrent que les génériques expriment 
des généralisations cognitivement par défaut – c’est-à-dire qu’ils expriment 
sur les espèces des généralisations basiques et précoces du point de vue 
du développement. Au contraire, les énoncés quantiiés expriment des 
généralisations cognitivement plus élaborées et ardues. D’autres données 
suggèrent que les généralisations génériques ne dépendent pas uniquement 
de la prévalence. Ces généralisations fondamentales sont plutôt sensibles 
à un certain nombre de facteurs liés au contenu, comme la possibilité que la 
propriété en question soit dangereuse ou bien surprenante, ou qu’elle est une 
propriété essentielle et caractéristique de l’espèce. Cela suggère que notre 
moyen le plus basique de former des généralisation inductives est sensible à 
des facteurs sémantiques riches.
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